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Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and 
Beccaria*
Emilio Mazza
IULM-Libera università di lingue e comunicazione, Milano       
Abstract. At the end of 1765 Morellet wrote to Hume: «I send you 3 copies of my 
translation of the book de’ delitti». A few days afterwards he informed Beccaria that 
Hume «desires me to tell you one thousand things for him». To justify his translation 
Morellet appeals to Hume’s authority: he «read the original and the translation with 
great care» and «approved of my freedom in translating it». In his works and letters 
Hume never mentions Beccaria: what about the «one thousand things» that he is sup-
posed to have told Morellet about Dei delitti? Were they close to those that Ramsay 
mentioned to Diderot? What did Hume think about the theory of original contract 
and the abolishment of capital punishment?
Keywords. David Hume, Cesare Beccaria, Allan Ramsay, Capital Punishment, Origi-
nal Contract.
GOOD THINGS: MORELLET, BECCARIA AND HUME.
«I send you 3 copies of my translation of the book de’ delitti»1, Morel-
let writes to Hume at the end of December 1765. A few days later he 
announces to Beccaria: «without having the honour of being known to 
you, I think myself entitled to send you a copy of my translation of your 
work»2. It is a «universal success»3. The new order, he claims, is fitted to 
the French genius4. D’Alembert appreciates it so much. Diderot, Helvétius, 
Buffon, Hume and d’Holbach send their congratulations5. Hume «desires 
me» – Morellet declares  –  «to tell you one thousand things for him»6. 
Milles choses de sa part. The great authorities approve of Morellet’s free-
dom in translating Beccaria’s Delitti. And Hume, who «read the origi-
* I am grateful to Giuseppe Cospito, Gianni Francioni, Marina Leoni, Alberto Mingardi, Gianluca 
Mori, Laura Nicolì, Emanuele Ronchetti, Luigi Turco for their useful comments. All the transla-
tions from Beccaria and Ramsay and Diderot are my own
1 A. Morellet to D. Hume, 31 December 1765, Edinburgh, NLS MSS 23153 n. 40.
2 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 3 January 1766, in Lettres d’André Morellet, ed. by D. Medlin, J.-C. 
David, and P. Leclerc, The Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 1991, p. 36.
3 Ibidem, p. 39.
4 Ibidem, pp. 41-42; cfr. ibidem, pp. 36, 39.
5 Ibidem, p. 39.
6 Ibidem.
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nal and the translation with great care»7, agrees with 
them.
The works of d’Alembert, Diderot, Helvétius, Buffon, 
and Hume – Beccaria replies (following Morellet’s order 
of names8) – are the object of his «continuous reading»9; 
even though it was Montesquieu who produced his phil-
osophical «conversion», and Helvétius who later accom-
plished it10. «The profound metaphysics of Hume» – 
Beccaria goes on – «the truth and novelty of his views 
astonished me and enlightened my understanding. Not 
so long ago I read the 18 volumes of his history with 
infinite pleasure»11.
In September 1766 Beccaria asks Morellet to send 
Hume a copy of his new edition to show how «sensible» 
he is of Hume’s attention to his work, and how «encour-
aged» he is by the «good» things Hume told Morel-
let about it and Morellet «faithfully» reported to him12. 
What about these good things? Hume probably reads 
Beccaria in autumn 1765. Four years before Hume’s 
philosophical and historical work was almost achieved; 
afterwards he does not feel the need to add any explicit 
reference to Beccaria (or any other French philosophe 
among those mentioned above); not even in the 1774 
essay «Of the Origin of Government»13.
7 Ibidem, p. 42. Like Ramsay, Hume probably read Beccaria’s 1765 third 
edition. There is no trace of it in the Hume library sold in 1840, which 
contains another edition given to Hume by Morellet: [C. Beccaria] Dei 
delitti e delle pene, Harlem [Livorno] 17665 (cfr. D.F. Norton, M.J. Nor-
ton, The David Hume Library, Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, Edin-
burgh 1996, p. 115). Morellet received some copies of this edition in 
July 1766 (A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, in Lettres d’André 
Morellet, cit., p. 60) and, satisfying Beccaria’s desire (ibidem, p. 73, note 
1), sent a copy to Hume in September (A. Morellet to D. Hume, 8 Sep-
tember 1766, ibidem, pp. 71-72).
8 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 3 January 1766, in Lettres d’André Morel-
let, cit., p. 39 («compliments de Mr. Diderot, de M. Helvetius, de M. 
De Buffon [...] M. Diderot [...] M. De Buffon [...] M. Hume [...] M. Le 
Baron d’Holbac [sic]»); C. Beccaria to A. Morellet, 26 January 1766, in 
C. Beccaria, Carteggio, ed. by C. Capra, R. Pasta and F. Pino Pongolini, 
in Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Cesare Beccaria, 16 vols., ed. by L. 
Firpo and G. Francioni, Mediobanca, Milano 1984, vol. IV, pp. 222-223 
(«Alembert, Diderot, Helvetius, Buffon, Hume [...] monsieur Helvétius 
[...] monsieur de Buffon [...] monsieur Diderot [...] monsieur Hume [...] 
monsieur Dalembert»), 226 («il signor Helvetius, Diderot, ed il signor 
di Buffon ed Hume e di Holbac [...] signor d’Alembert»). Beccaria mere-
ly thanks d’Holbach, without adding any (positive) remarks on his phi-
losophy.
9 C. Beccaria to A. Morellet, 26 January 1766, in Beccaria, Carteggio, cit., 
222. 
10 Ibidem.
11 Ibidem, p. 223.
12 A. Morellet to D. Hume, 8 September 1766, Lettres d’André Morellet, 
cit., pp. 71-72.
13 Beccaria is never mentioned in the most recent companions to Hume: 
The Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. by P. Russell, Oxford Universi-
ty Press, Oxford 2016; The Continuum Companion to Hume, ed. by A. 
Bailey and D. O’Brien, The Continuum International Publishing, Lon-
don 2012; The Cambridge Companion to Hume, by D.F. Norton and J. 
DIFFERENT KINDS OF CEMENT: BECCARIA AND 
HUME.
Reading carefully Dei delitti (if indeed he did it), 
Hume could have enjoyed Beccaria’s assertion, and his 
Lockean use of the cement image: «it is demonstrated 
that the union of the ideas is the cement which forms 
the entire fabric of human understanding»14. Hume 
called himself «inventor» for the use he makes of the 
principles of association: these principles «are really to 
us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of 
the mind must, in a great measure, depend on them»15. 
Yet, it is unlikely that Beccaria, who couldn’t read Eng-
lish (despite Morellet’s exhortations16), knew the Abstract 
of the Treatise. 
We all know that Beccaria read Hume. We all repeat 
what he declares. Since Morellet told him that Hume 
enjoyed his work (and Morellet’s translation), how could 
Beccaria declare something different17? Why do we not 
Taylor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 20092; A Companion 
to Hume, ed. by E. Radcliffe, Blackwell, Oxford 2008. He is not even 
mentioned in E.C. Mossner, The Life of David Hume, Oxford Universi-
ty Press, Oxford 1980; A. Sabl, Hume’s Politics. Coordination and Crisis 
in the “History of England”, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2012; 
J.A. Harris, Hume. An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2015. There are a few exceptions. Burton, for example, 
underlines the utilitarian connection between Hume and Beccaria (J.H. 
Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume, 2 vols., W. Tait, Edin-
burgh 1846, vol. I, p. 121; cfr. J.A. Harris, Liberty, necessity and moral 
responsibility, in The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Phi-
losophy, ed. by A. Garrett, Routledge, London 2014, pp. 320-337: 335; 
J.E. Crimmins, Utility and religion, ibidem, pp. 465-499: 481-485, 494), 
and Berry maintains that Beccaria’s view on luxury «bear the hallmarks 
of his knowledge» of Hume’s History (C. Berry, David Hume, Blooms-
bury, London 2009, p. 124; cfr. L.L. Bongie, David Hume. Prophet of the 
Counter-revolution, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 20002, p. 13). 
14 C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, [M. Coltellini], Lausanna [Livor-
no] 17653, § XVIII, p. 55 (cfr. C. Beccaria, Des délits et des peines / Dei 
delitti e delle pene, ed. by P. Audegean and G. Francioni, ENS, Lyon 
2009, § XIX, p. 206; hereafter BAF). For the Lockean flavour of the 
cement image, cfr. J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, 
ed. by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1985, II, XI, § 13, p. 161; 
II, XXIII, § 26, p. 310; II, XXXIII, § 11, p. 398.
15 D. Hume, An Abstract of a Book lately Published; Entituled, «A Trea-
tise of Human Nature», in A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Sel-
by-Bigge, rev. by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, pp. 640-
662: 662. 
16 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, in Lettres d’André Morel-
let, p. 60.
17 Audegean at first appositely remarks on the influence of the con-
text on Beccaria’s acknowledgments in the letter to Morellet, and then 
reverts to the common opinion: «it is likely that these readings had the 
importance and the impact that Beccaria ascribed them» (P. Audegean, 
Introduction, BAF, p. 25); with regard to Hume’s influence on Beccaria, 
he consequently makes the common reference: G. Imbruglia, Riform-
ismo e illuminismo. Il Dei delitti e delle pene tra Napoli e l’Europa, in 
Cesare Beccaria. La pratica dei lumi, ed. by V. Ferrone and G. Francioni, 
Olschki, Firenze 2000, pp. 99-126 (cfr. Audegean, La philosophie de Bec-
caria. Savoir punir, savoir écrire, savoir produire, Vrin, Paris 2010, cit., p. 
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precisely indicate the passages where Hume’s French 
translations exert an influence on Beccaria’s writings?
A METAPHYSICAL INEFFECTUAL TREATISE: RAMSAY 
AND BECCARIA.
«Diderot had transmitted me a letter from M. Ram-
say [...] which contains some general critical ref lec-
tions on your work»18, Morellet writes to Beccaria in 
July 1766. In October 1765, chez d’Holbach, Diderot 
had informed Ramsay about Dei delitti19. At the end 
of January 1766 Ramsay sends Diderot his ref lec-
tions20, and Diderot, considering them «too serious to 
be neglected»21, translates them into French and gives 
them to Morellet22, who sends these «false discouraging 
maxims»23 to Beccaria. One year after, Alessandro Verri 
informs Pietro that Diderot gave Beccaria some short 
«objections» as «very powerful», but Beccaria did not 
take the trouble to answer them24. In March Morellet is 
still remembering Ramsay’s reflections to Beccaria: «I 
recommend you [...] the letter from Ramsay that I gave 
you»25.
Allan Ramsay is the first painter to the King of 
England. «It is said that he paints badly, but he reasons 
well»26, Diderot remarks. In 1765 Ramsay is already 
23, note 1).
18 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, in Lettres d’André Morel-
let, cit., p. 60. 
19 Ramsay owns that he was informed about Beccaria’s work in Paris 
(chez d’Holbach) by Diderot and Suard (D. Diderot, Correspondance V 
(Janvier 1765 – Février 1766), ed. by G. Roth, Les éditions de Minuit, 
Paris 1959, p. 246). Ramsay possibly arrives in Paris at the beginning of 
September 1765, since Diderot dined with him (chez van Loo) on the 
2nd (ibidem, p. 113), and with him, Hume and Walpole (chez d’Holbach) 
on the 6th. Ramsay leaves Paris on the 15th of October 1765 (ibidem, p. 
137). 
20 Ibidem, p. 245 and note 3.
21 J.-A. Naigeon, Avertissement de l’Éditeur, in Œuvres de Denis Diderot, 
ed. by J.-A. Naigeon, Desray et Deterville, Paris 1798, vol. IX, pp. 449-
450: 449.
22 At the beginning of June 1766 Morellet possibly received Diderot’s 
translation of Ramsay’s «general critical reflections» (A. Morellet to C. 
Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., p. 60). In 1765 
Diderot and Morellet «talked a lot» about Beccaria’s work, and Morel-
let has written his own «observations» and «reflections» resulting from 
these «conversations» (A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 3 janvier 1766, ibi-
dem, p. 39; A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, ibidem, p. 60).
23 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 July 1766, ibidem, p. 60.
24 A. Verri to P. Verri, 15 January 1767, in Viaggio a Parigi e Londra 
(1766-1767). Carteggio di Pietro e Alessandro Verri, ed. by G. Gaspari, 
Adelphi, Milano 1980, p. 247; cfr. E. Mazza, Hume’s «Meek» Philosophy 
among the Milanese, in Impressions of Hume, ed. by P.J.K. Kail and M. 
Frasca-Spada, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 213-243.
25 A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 14-15 March 1767, Lettres d’André Morel-
let, cit., p. 88. 
26 D. Diderot to S. Volland, 8 September 1765, Correspondance V, cit., p. 
113. Diderot, who first met Ramsay chez the painter Louis-Michel van 
known as a political writer: the Gazette littéraire, 
edited by Suard, calls him a follower of Harrington’s 
Oceana who is well acquainted with Hume’s History27. 
In 1762, Voltaire’s history of Jean Calas had called him 
a «philosopher»28, because, Diderot adds, he «opened 
the eyes to English Justice» and saved some gentlemen 
from capital punishment29. Ramsay’s reflections (a «light 
reading»30 of the Italian original) concern the Introduc-
tion and the first two chapters of Beccaria’s work. It is 
a double attack: against the theory of social contract in 
general, and against Dei delitti in particular. Ramsay is 
sceptic concerning Beccaria’s ingenious observations and 
their possible useful consequences; yet he is assertive 
concerning their philosophical weakness: their founda-
tions are «too uncertain […] to support a useful and sol-
id edifice»31. A few months before Grimm had written: 
Beccaria’s edifice lacks «solid» foundations32.
Loo at the beginning of September (is van Loo one of those who say 
that Ramsay «paints badly»?), depicted him as the author mentioned by 
Voltaire in his «papers on the Calas» (ibidem).
27 Review of the «Essai sur la Constitution d’Angleterre», «Supplément à la 
Gazette Littéraire de l’Europe», 28 April 1765, no. 10, art. VII, pp. 285-
295: 295; cfr. ibidem, art. VI, pp. 243-253: 245; Review of the «Essai sur 
la Constitution d’Angleterre», «Journal des Sçavants», March 1765, pp. 
251-254: 252 (cfr. Review of «An Essay on the Constitution of England», 
«The Monthly Review», XXXII, 1765, pp. 59-66: 59); Review of the 
«Essai sur la Constitution d’Angleterre», «Gazette Littéraire de l’Europe», 
June 1765, no. 6, pp. 311-327: 311.
28 Voltaire, Histoire d’Elisabeth Canning et de Jean Calas, [Paris] 1762, p. 5.
29 D. Diderot to S. Volland, 8 September 1765, Correspondance V, cit., 
p. 113.
30 [A. Ramsay] «Il y a environ un mois...», end of January 1766, in Did-
erot, Correspondance V, cit., letter 374, pp. 245-254: 246 (hereafter RR). 
Ramsay’s reflections are contained in a letter to Diderot: the original 
was in English, and Diderot translated it into French (Naigeon, Aver-
tissement de l’Éditeur, cit., p. 449; A. Morellet to C. Beccaria, 17-28 
July 1766, Lettres d’André Morellet, cit., p. 60). Grimm first made public 
Diderot’s translation in the Correspondance littéraire on the 15th of July 
1766 (U. Kölving, J. Carriat, Inventaire de la «Correspondance littéraire» 
de Grimm et Meister, 3 vols., The Voltaire Foundation, Oxford 1984, 
vol. I, p. 184 n. 66:207), together with a «Notice sur Ramsay» (ibidem, 
n. 66:206). In January 1782 Meister included it again in the Correspon-
dance (ibidem, vol. II, p. 32 n. 82:001). Diderot’s translation was pub-
lished by Naigeon in 1798, cfr. [A. Ramsay] «Lettre de M. De Ramsay, 
peintre du roi d’Angleterre A M. Diderot», in Œuvres de Denis Diderot, 
cit., pp. 451-466. 
31 RR, p. 246 (cfr. RR, p. 248). On Ramsay and Beccaria, cfr. F. Hörcher, 
Beccaria, Voltaire, and the Scots on Capital Punishment: A Comparative 
View of the Legal Enlightenment, in Scotland and France in the Enlight-
enment, ed. by D. Dawson and P. Morère, Associated University Press, 
London 2010, pp. 305-330: 308, 314-316; A. Smart, Alan Ramsay. Paint-
er, Essayist and Man of the Enlightenment, Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London 1992, pp. 201-202.
32 [M. Grimm] «M. l’abbé Morellet...», 1 December 1765, in Correspon-
dance Littéraire, Philosophique et Critique par Grimm, Diderot, Meis-
ter Etc., par M. Tourneux, Garnier, Paris 1878, vol. VI, pp. 422-429: 
427 (Kölving, Carriat, Inventaire, cit., vol. I, p. 169 n. 65:359); cfr. [M. 
Grimm] «Un petit livret, intitulé Dei Delitti...», 1 August 1765, in Cor-
respondance Littéraire, cit., pp. 329-337 (Kölving, Carriat, Inventaire, cit., 
vol. I, p. 162, n. 65:234).
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The first attack is in two phases. First, the «meta-
physical idea» of a social contract «has no source in any 
real transaction»33 (again, Ramsay agrees with Grimm34, 
and Ferguson will follow them35). Secondly, Beccaria’s 
method is far from being experimental, therefore his 
system is full of «ambiguities» and «contradictions»36. 
Beccaria must acknowledge that force is «a tie of this 
voluntary contract»: without its «menace» we shall be 
«incessantly» inclined to take back our smallest portion 
of liberty37. Beccaria concedes that we are «constrained 
by necessity» to consent to such contracts; yet he does not 
say whether they were voluntary, and whether men had 
been brought into them by need or necessity38. Finally, if 
by social contract Beccaria means a tacit «mutual obliga-
tion» between the powerful and the weak (protection and 
service)39, such a contract had always existed and will 
always exist (even between the Mogol and his subjects), 
but it is a «poor basis» for an edifice of civil liberty40. 
Here begins the second attack. Again, it is in two 
phases. First, if moral politics must be founded on our 
indelible sentiments, as Beccaria asserts, we should 
first consider our universal «desire of superiority and 
command»41 (in 1774 Hume will call it «Love of domin-
ion», which, he says, is «so strong»42): those who «actu-
ally» possess power must necessarily use «all the means 
they can» to protect their authority and safety43. They 
must «prevent and punish» every plot, with a degree of 
«severity proportioned to the danger»44. Therefore, in 
governments of a certain nature (like Turkey), those who 
propose «to suppress tortures [...] (upon the lightest sus-
picion) and the most cruel executions (upon the smallest 
proof), will tend to deprive the governments of the best 
means of security»45. The laws and their severities did 
flow everywhere from the particular «circumstances», 
«necessities» and «dangers» of the particular societies46. 
33 RR, p. 246.
34 [Grimm] «M. l’abbé Morellet...», Correspondance Littéraire, 
Philosophique et Critique par Grimm, Diderot, Meister Etc., cit., p. 427.
35 A. Ferguson, Principles of Moral and Political Science, 2 vols., A. Strah-
an and T. Cadell, London / W. Creech, Edinburgh 1792, vol. II, pp. 220-
221.
36 RR, p. 247.
37 Ibidem.
38 Ibidem.  
39 Ibidem, pp. 247-248. 
40 Ibidem, p. 248.
41 Ibidem. The expression recalls Machiavelli’s «ambition and desire of 
command» (N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, The University of Chica-
go Press, Chicago-London 1996, p. 28).
42 D. Hume, Of the Origin of Government, in Essays and Treatises on Sev-
eral Subjects, 2 vols., T. Cadell, London 1777, vol. I, pp. 35-39: 37.
43 RR, p. 248 (emphasis added).
44 RR, p. 249.
45 Ibidem.
46 RR, pp. 249-250.
Secondly, Ramsay sets up a dialogue between Bec-
caria and his adversaries. Beccaria complains that men 
commonly abandon the «most important» regulations 
into the hands of «those whose interest is to oppose the 
most wise laws», that is, Ramsay translates, the «rich 
and powerful» men47; but these interested men are the 
«only» persons «naturally» apt to exert this preroga-
tive48. Force always commands over weakness49 (again, 
Grimm says almost the same50). Beccaria complains 
that laws commonly arise from a «fortuitous and tem-
porary necessity»; but, «without necessity, there would 
have been no law at all»51. Beccaria complains that 
only a «few happy nations» did speed the intermediary 
stages by «good laws», instead of waiting for the «slow 
motion of human vicissitudes»52; but, as history shows 
(a Machiavellian retort53), these happy nations «nev-
er» existed, and the same good laws are the outcome 
of human vicissitudes54. Laws are commonly written 
«with the sword» to the advantage of those who estab-
lish them55. Beccaria may well obtain the praise of the 
inexperienced, insignificant and ignored partisans of 
reason56; but his particular reform asks for a universal 
revolution, which can happen only in a very violent way 
(an obvious calamity)57. Dei delitti, Ramsay concludes, 
is a «speculative» work, which does not consider the 
«actual» interests and safety of the masters58. It shows 
the wit and «humanity»59 of the author (a traditional, 
and sometimes slightly ironical, remark)60, but will 
47 RR, p. 250. Ramsay quotes the original Italian («gli uomini […] piu 
provvide leggi»; Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., «Introduzione», p. 5; BAF, 
p. 142) and either he – or Diderot – adds a French translation with an 
omission («alla giornaliera prudenza»; RR, pp. 250-251).
48 RR, p. 251.
49 Ibidem.
50 [Grimm] «M. l’abbé Morellet...», Correspondance Littéraire, 
Philosophique et Critique par Grimm, Diderot, Meister Etc., cit., p. 428.
51 RR, p. 251; Ramsay refers to the «Introduzione» («le leggi [...] nate da 
una fortuita e passeggiera necessità» (Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., «Intro-
duzione», p. 6; BAF, p. 142).
52 RR, p. 251; Ramsay quotes the original Italian («Felici sono [...] buone 
leggi»; Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., «Introduzione», p. 6; BAF, p. 142) and 
either he – or Diderot – adds a French translation.
53 Beccaria maintains: «Let’s open the Histories, and we shall see that 
the Laws...» (Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., «Introduzione», p. 6 [emphasis 
added]; BAF, p. 142); and Ramsay replies: «if these philosophers would 
open the history and see to what are due the best institutions» (RR, p. 
253 [emphasis added]), «if he [Beccaria] would take the pains to exam-
ine carefully the history and the archives of the nations...» (RR, p. 251). 
Possibly recalling Hume’s works, Ramsay frequently appeals to «history 
and observation» (RR, p. 246) against Beccaria.
54 RR, p. 251.
55 RR, pp. 251-252.
56 RR, p. 252.
57 Ibidem.
58 Ibidem.
59 RR, pp. 246, 252.
60 Cfr. [Grimm] «Un petit livret, intitulé Dei Delitti...», Correspondance 
125Mille choses de sa part. Hume, Ramsay and Beccaria*
never have «any actual and present influence on human 
affairs»61. 
«OF CRIMES» REFORMED (BY RAMSAY).
Those who want to reform the laws should enquire 
into «the actual and real origin of different govern-
ments and their different laws»62 and survey «only one 
single society at a time»63 – this is Ramsay’s prescrip-
tion. If they discover some «unnecessarily severe» laws, 
they should modestly address themselves to the masters 
and show them that the same «circumstances», which 
originally required these laws, may be satisfied by means 
«more mild for the subjects and at least equally safe for 
the masters»64. The reformers should always consider the 
security of «those who alone have the power to sanction 
the laws»65. 
In 1771 Diderot seems to have Ramsay’s reflections 
on the table. Punishments, he writes, can only refer to 
the «security of the masters»66, which is the supreme 
law, and they must be different in different nations: in 
Constantinople one illicit assembly is enough to stran-
gle a Sultan, in London it takes twenty years of illicit 
assemblies to overthrow a minister (this is Ramsay’s 
example)67. Ramsay recalls Grimm, and Diderot recalls 
Ramsay. Are their observations the outcome of their 
common discussions in 1765? The work of the humane 
Beccaria is not «so important», nor his ideas «so true»68 
as they are claimed to be.
Littéraire, Philosophique et Critique par Grimm, Diderot, Meister Etc., 
cit., p. 344; [Grimm] «M. l’abbé Morellet...», ibidem, pp. 427, 429; [Vol-
taire] Commentaire sur le Livre Des délits et des peines, Par un Avocat de 
Province, [Paris] 1766, IX, p. 51; XII, p. 63; D. Diderot, Recherches sur 
le style, in Encyclopédie Méthodique. Philosophie ancienne et moderne, 3 
vols., ed. by J. A. Naigeon, Panckoucke, Paris 1792, t. II, pp. 223a-224b: 
223b; P. Verri to A. Verri, 15 gennaio 1767, Viaggio a Parigi e Londra 
(1766-1767), cit., p. 247. 
61 RR, p. 252.
62 RR, p. 246.
63 RR, p. 250.
64 Ibidem.
65 Ibidem.
66 Diderot, Recherches sur le style, cit., p. 223b. 
67 Ibidem (cfr. RR, p. 239). Ramsay refers to «Robert Walpole», Diderot 
to a London «minister»: in both cases the term of comparison is the 
Sultan of Constantinople.
68 Diderot, Recherches sur le style, cit., p. 223b. It is certainly difficult, as 
Venturi observes, «to say to what extent Diderot [...] might have been 
influenced by this letter from Allan Ramsay» (F. Venturi, Utopia and 
Reform in the Enlightenment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1971, p. 110); and it is equally difficult to say to what extent this letter 
from Ramsay was influenced by Grimm’s Correspondance littéraire, and 
Diderot’s and Suard’s observations, since Diderot and Suard were those 
who first introduced Ramsay to Dei delitti (RR, p. 246). 
THE HUMEAN RAMSAY AS A POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHER.
In 1754 Ramsay and Hume founded the Edinburgh 
Select Society, where they discuss the questions «Wheth-
er Capital punishment be the most proper method for 
restraining theft?»69, and «Whether severe or moderate 
punishments have the greatest effect in preventing the 
commission of Crimes?»70. 
In 1753 Ramsay had published An Essay on Ridicule 
and Elizabeth Canning71, which was celebrated by Vol-
taire72. In 1755 he publishes a dialogue On taste73, which 
recalls Hume’s A Dialogue and is silently discussed in 
Hume’s Of the Standard of Taste74. As a Humean writ-
er, Ramsay intends to show the «usefulness and neces-
sity of experimental reasoning in philological and 
moral enquiries»75 (Hume’s Treatise is An Attempt to 
introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into 
Moral Subjects), and recalls that philosophy is «noth-
ing but common sense and experience methodised»76 
(according to Hume «philosophical Decisions are noth-
ing but the Reflections of common Life, methodiz’d and 
corrected»77). In 1765 Ramsay publishes the Essay on the 
constitution of England; in 1766 he writes the Thoughts 
on the Origin and Nature of Government, which were to 
be published three years later (Hume probably possessed 
all of them)78. Before his arrival in Paris the Gazette 
69 NLS, Select Society Adv. Mss. 23.1.1, pp. 43, 67. The question, named 
as a subject of debate in January and November 1755, is declared 
«Debated» (ibidem, p. 191). 
70 NLS, Select Society Adv. Mss. 23.1.1, pp. 150, 167. The question, 
named as a subject of debate in January 1760 and June 1761, is declared 
«Debated» (ibidem, p. 250), possibly in July 1761.
71 [A. Ramsay] A Letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of – Concerning 
the Affair of Elizabeth Canning. By a Clergyman, T. Seddon, London 1753.
72 Voltaire, Histoire d’Elisabeth Canning et de Jean Calas, [Paris] 1762.
73 [A. Ramsay] The Investigator. Number CCCXXII, A. Millar, London, 
1755. Ramsay’s performance is retitled in 1762: The Investigator. Con-
taining the following Tracts. I. On Ridicule. II. On Elizabeth Canning. 
III. On Naturalization. IV. On Taste, London 1762; A Dialogue on Taste, 
London 17622.
74 Cfr. E. Mazza, Fluctuations: manners and Religion in Hume’s “Of the 
Standard of Taste”, in The Humean Mind, ed. by A. Coventry and A. 
Sager, Routledge, London 2019, pp. 272-284 
75 [A. Ramsay] Advertisement to An Essay on Ridicule, A. Millar, London 
1753, p. i.
76 [A. Ramsay] The Investigator. Number CCCXXII, cit., p. 28.
77 D. Hume, Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding, A. 
Millar, London 1748, p. 251. 
78 [A. Ramsay] An Essay on the Constitution of England, T. Becket and 
P.A. De Hondt, London 1765; An Essay on the Constitution of England, 
T. Becket and P.A. de Hondt, London 17662; [A. Ramsay] Thoughts 
on the Origin and Nature of Government. Occasioned by The late Dis-
putes between Great Britain and her American Colonies. Written in the 
Year 1766, T. Becket and P.A. de Hondt, London 1769. Hume probably 
owned a «unique» collection of all Ramsay’s essays (cfr. Norton, Norton, 
The David Hume Library, cit., pp. 34-35, 45, 124). 
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Littéraire announces: he is a «skilful painter, already 
known for some ingenious writings»79. 
Both the Essay on the constitution and the Thoughts 
on the origin of government show some connection with 
the ref lections on Beccaria. Especially the Thoughts, 
which attack those who believe in «a voluntary social 
contract, by which each man gives up, as it were into a 
common stock, a small portion of this natural liberty»80. 
The ref lections had attacked those who believe that 
«each man, by contributing to this imaginary repository, 
puts in it only the smallest possible portion of his own 
liberty»81. The Essay makes repeated appeals to «experi-
ence» and the «real» motives of men, like their «hopes 
of superiority»82. The political philosopher must have an 
«attentive eye» to the «constituents» of government and 
their interests83. The Thoughts repeat these appeals, and 
proceed to attack the «idle dreams of metaphysicians, 
uncountenanced by fact and experience», who main-
tain that «all the rights of government are derived from 
a voluntary social contract»84. «Unfortunately», Ramsay 
writes, «no such voluntary contract was ever known to 
be entered into»85 (does Bentham, who is acquainted 
with Hume86, know Ramsay?87). The rights of govern-
ment are built upon the «weakness and necessities of 
79 Review of the «Essai sur la Constitution d’Angleterre», «Supplément à la 
Gazette Littéraire de l’Europe», 28 April 1765, n. 10, cit., p. 295.
80 [Ramsay] Thoughts on the Origin, cit., p. 9 (emphasis added).
81 RR, p. 247 (emphasis added; cfr. Beccaria, Dei delitti, cit., § I, p. 8; § 
II, p. 10; BAF, pp. 146, 148). 
This could be Ramsay’s only textual reference to the chapter «The death 
penalty» («laws are nothing but a sum of the smallest portions of each 
man’s own freedom»; Beccaria, Dei delitti, cit., § 27, p. 73; BAF, p. 228); 
yet, it is more likely that Ramsay is still referring to the chapters «The 
origin of punishment»  («the sum of all these portions of freedom sac-
rificed to the good of everyone forms the sovereignity [...] everyone is 
always trying to take out of the repository his own portion»; Beccaria, 
Dei delitti, cit., § 1, p. 8; BAF, p. 146) and «The right to punish» («none 
want to put in the public repository more than the smallest possible 
portion of his freedom [...] the aggregate of these smallest possible por-
tions forms the right to punish»; Beccaria, Dei delitti, cit., § 2, p. 10; 
BAF, p. 148).
82 [Ramsay] An Essay on the Constitution of England, 17662, cit., sect. II, 
p. 15. 
83 Ibidem, sect. I, p. 6.
84 [Ramsay] Thoughts on the Origin, cit., p. 9.
85 Ibidem.
86 According to Bentham the notion of original contract «had been 
effectually demolished by Mr Hume» (J. Bentham, A Fragment on Gov-
ernment, ed. by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2001, p. 51).
87 «In this society we will say no contract has as yet been entered into» 
(Bentham, A Fragment on Government, cit., p. 50). In 1770 Ramsay’s 
pupil, the engraver and portrait painter David Martin, «offered to paint 
Bentham, who refused [...], as he could not afford to pay the import 
duty into England» (J. Bowring, Memoirs of Bentham, in The Works of 
Jeremy Bentham, W. Tait, Edinburgh 1842, 66b).
mankind»88. If a contract exists, it is a «reciprocal obli-
gation of protection and service»89 («if you are powerful 
I will be obedient»90). Any act of power must tend to the 
«support or safety of government»91. Any project, which 
does not proceed upon this, will be «for ever abortive, or 
fatal to the projector»92.
In Elizabeth Canning Ramsay allowed: «in the pre-
sent state of ignorance, credulity, and irregular method 
of enquiry, I should be extremely fearful of my life and 
character, if I were accused of a capital offence; and 
should, by no means, think my innocence a sufficient 
protection»93. A battle in favour of a legal trial does not 
necessarily mean a battle against capital punishment.
SUICIDE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: HUME IN 
PARIS. 
Self-murderers, the Persian Letters deplore, «are put 
to death a second time»94. Any punishment for suicide, 
Beccaria agrees, is «useless and unjust»95. Suicide, Hume 
proclaims, is no «transgression of our duty either to 
God, our neighbour, or ourselves»96. According to Mon-
tesquieu, «the English kill themselves» even in the very 
midst of happiness97. A travelling Englishman, Diderot 
adds, «is often a man who gets out of his country in 
order to kill himself somewhere else»98. One of them, 
he goes on, has just thrown himself into the Seine. It is 
September 1765. «They fished him out alive and brought 
him to the Grand Châtelet»99. The English Ambassador 
«had to interpose his authority to prevent them from 
putting him to death»100. 
As the Secretary to the English Embassy, Hume 
makes the French understand that there is no Anglo-
French treatise that «forbids an Englishman from 
drowning himself in the Seine under pain of death»101. 
And then he amusingly concludes: «if my compatriot 
had unfortunately been jailed, he would have risked 
88 [Ramsay] Thoughts on the Origin, cit., p. 10. 
89 Ibidem, p. 11; cfr. ibidem, p. 14.
90 Ibidem, p. 25.
91 Ibidem, p. 21; cfr. ibidem, p. 25.
92 Ibidem, p. 11.
93 [A. Ramsay] The Affair of Elizabeth Canning, cit., 1753, p. 55.
94 Montesquieu, Lettres Persanes, 2 vols., P. Marteau, Cologne 1731, vol. 
2, letter LXIV, p. 9.
95 Beccaria, Dei Delitti, cit., § XXXI, p. 101 (BAF, p. 260). 
96 [D. Hume] Essay I [Of Suicide], in Two Essays, London 1777, p. 5.
97 [Montesquieu] De l’Esprit des Loix, 2 vols., Barillot, Geneve 1748, vol. 
I, XIV, XI, p. 377.
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disgracefully losing his life for having or not having 
drowned himself. If the English are quite mad, you will 
allow that the French are quite ridiculous»102. Marischal 
Keith congratulates Hume for so «many good works» 
in his ministerial functions and for saving «a poor fel-
low from the gallows who chose rather to drown than 
starve»103. The author of Suicide is closer to that of Dei 
delitti in practice than in theory104.
TYRANNICIDE AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
HARMFUL THEREFORE BLAMEWORTHY. 
Tyrannicide was so «approv’d of by ancient 
Maxims»105, Hume remarks in 1748; yet «instead of 
keeping Tyrants and Userpers in Awe, made them ten 
times more fierce and unrelenting»106. Now it is «uni-
versally condemn’d as a base and treacherous Method 
of bringing to Justice these Disturbers of Society»107. Its 
useless or harmful consequences make it blameworthy. 
In 1751 Hume recalls the question. «History and Experi-
ence [...] [have] convinc’d us, that this Practice encreas-
es the Jealousy and Cruelty of Princes»108: if its «great 
Inconveniencies» could have «prov’d clearly» to the 
ancients, we could have «reform’d their sentiments» con-
cerning tyrannicide109. Can the same argument be used 
against capital punishment? 
Hume’s History applies it against the attempt to 
extirpate a widespread heretical opinion «by capital 
punishments». Besides its «extreme barbarity», this 
attempt «proves commonly ineffectual to the purpose 
intended»110: it «serves only to make men more obstinate 
in their persuasion»111. Yet, someone else argues, unlike 
soft persecution, which does «serve only to irritate the 
102 Ibidem.
103 G. Keith to D. Hume, Postdam, 10th September 1765, NLS MS 23155, 
n. 112, ff. 85-88: f. 85.
104 In 1757 Hume ironically declares that he will proceed directly «to 
recommend Suicide & Adultery» (D. Hume to J. Edmonstoune of New-
ton, 29 September 1757, in New Letters of David Hume, ed. by R. Kli-
bansky and E.C. Mossner, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1954, p. 43). Yet he 
never declares that he will proceed to recommend the abolition of cap-
ital punishment. With regard to this question he doesnt’t wish to be a 
«disturber of the public peace among philosophers» (P. Bayle, Arcesilas, 
in Dictionnaire historique et critique, 4 vols., P. Brunel et al., Amster-
dam-Leyde 17405, vol. I, Rem E, p. 285b; cfr. ibidem, p. 285).
105 D. Hume, Of Passive Obedience, in Essays, Moral and Political, A. 
Millar, London / A. Kincaid, Edinburgh 17483, pp. 308-312: 310.
106 Ibidem.
107 Ibidem.
108 D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, A. Millar, 
London 1751, pp. 29-30.
109 D. Hume, A Dialogue, ibidem, pp. 223-253: 240. 
110 D. Hume, The History of England under the House of Tudor, 2 vols., 
A. Millar, London 1759, vol. I, p. 375.
111 Ibidem.
sects, without disabling them from resistance», hard per-
secution is useful: «the stake, the wheel, and the gibbet, 
must soon terminate in the extirpation or banishment 
of all the heretics, [...] and in the entire silence and sub-
mission of the rest»112. And Hume bitterly acknowledges: 
since the latter argument was «more agreeable to the 
cruel bigotry» of the Queen, it was «better received»113. 
HUME AND THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL SIN. 
«Of the Original Contract» anticipates some of 
Ramsay’s reflections114. The essay is «a short, but com-
pleat Refutation of the political Systems of Sydney, 
Locke, and the Whigs, which [...] are plainly [...] repug-
nant to Reason & the Practice of all Nations» (even 
though «all the half Philosophers of the Nation have 
implicitely embrac’d for near a Century»115). These «so 
refin’d»116 systems, which «suppose that there is a Kind 
of original Contract»117, can only be either «seditious» or 
«delirious»118. 
Hume appeals to «History or Experience»119. The 
notion of an original contract could have a meaning 
only if referred to government in its «earliest infancy»120: 
savage people «voluntarily [...] abandon’d their native 
Liberty» for the advantages of peace and order121. If this 
«be meant by original Contract, it cannot be denied that 
all Government is, at first, founded on a Contract»122 
(Ramsay follows the same line of argument: «if by his 
social contract our Italian means [...] we are ready to 
acknowledge that...»123). Yet, philosophers assert that 
«even at present», in its «full Maturity», government 
«rests on no other Foundation»124. If they look outside in 
the world, they will find «every where» sovereigns, who 
«claim their Subjects as their Property», and subjects, 
112 Ibidem, p. 377.
113 Ibidem.
114 On Hume’s criticism of the notion of original contract, cfr. A Treatise 
of Human Nature, cit., pp. 541-542, 547-549.
115 D. Hume to Lord Elibank, 8 January 1748 O.S., in E.C. Mossner, New 
Hume Letters to Lord Elibank, 1748-1776, «Texas Studies in Literature 
and Language», 4, 1962, pp. 431-460: 437. 
116 D. Hume, Of the Original Contract, in Essays, Moral and Political, cit., 
pp. 289-307: 293.
117 Ibidem, p. 289.
118 Ibidem, p. 294.
119 Ibidem, p. 295; cfr. ibidem, pp. 293, 296, 304; supra, note 54.
120 Hume, Of the Original Contract, cit., p. 292; cfr. ibidem, pp. 291-292, 
294.
121 Ibidem, p. 291.
122 Ibidem, pp. 291-292.
123 RR, pp. 247-248.
124 Hume, Of the Original Contract, cit., p. 292.
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who «acknowledge this Right» in them125. There is noth-
ing discoverable «but Force and Violence»: no «volun-
tary Association»126. The necessity of human affairs will 
never admit of this consent. Historical governments have 
been «originally» founded «either on Usurpation, or 
Conquest, or both without any [...] fair Consent, or vol-
untary Subjection»127: «Force, by dissolving the ancient 
Governments, is the Origin of almost all the new ones, 
that ever were establish’d in the World»128. In 1758 
Hume adds a footnote: «New discoveries are not to be 
expected in these matters»129. 
In the «Idea of a perfect Commonwealth» Hume 
maintains that «all plans of government, which sup-
pose great reformation in the manners of mankind, are 
plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the republic of 
Plato, and the Utopia of Thomas More»130. According to 
Ramsay «all speculative work, such as that dei Delitti e 
delle Pene, belong to the category of utopias, of platon-
ic republics and other ideal politics»131. Perhaps Hume 
would have called Dei delitti an imaginary reformation; 
certainly he thought that «political projectors» are very 
«pernicious», where they have power, and very «ridicu-
lous», where they want it132.
HUME AND (CAPITAL) PUNISHMENT. 
The young Hume knew the train of ideas of a pris-
oner going to the scaffold: «the action of the executioner; 
the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convul-
sive motions, and death»133. He knew that people com-
monly feel a «kindness» for him. He accounted for this 
in the Treatise134, possibly drawing from a bookish expe-
rience (Hobbes and Malebranche)135. Unlike Alessan-
125 Ibidem, p. 293.
126 Ibidem, p. 295.
127 Ibidem.
128 Ibidem, p. 298. 
129 D. Hume, Of the Original Contract, in Essays and Treatises on Several 
Subjects, A. Millar, London / A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, Edinburgh 
1758, pp. 252-262: 262, note g. Even Boullainvilliers, Hume adds, knew 
that «time alone bestowed right and authority on what was commonly 
at first founded on force and violence» (ibidem).
130 D. Hume, Of the Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in Political Dis-
courses, R. Fleming for A. Kincaid and A. Donaldson, Edinburgh 1752, 
pp. 281-304: 283.
131 RR, p. 252.
132 Hume, Of the Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, cit., p. 281. The sen-
tence was deleted after the 1770 edition.
133 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, cit., p. 406.
134 Ibidem, p. 388.
135 T. Hobbes, Human Nature, in The Elements of Law Natural and Pol-
itic, ed. by J.A.C. Gaskin, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994, p. 53; 
N. Malebranche, De la Recherche de la vérité, ed. by G. Rodis-Lewis, 3 
vols., Vrin, Paris 19913, vol. I, pp. 238-239.
dro Verri, he never went outside London to see the new 
«English way of being hanged»136, as Alessandro calls it.
In 1752 Hume observes that at the end of the Roman 
commonwealth the laws were «absurdly contriv’d»137: 
«all capital punishments were abolish’d» and, however 
dangerous any citizen might be, he was regularly pun-
ished by «banishment»138 (Hume seems to follow Sal-
lust139 and criticise Montesquieu140). It became «nec-
essary» to make use of private vengeance and it wasn’t 
easy «to set bounds to» it141. «One extreme produces 
another»142, he concludes: «in the same manner as exces-
sive severity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation 
in their execution; so their excessive lenity naturally 
engenders cruelty and barbarity»143. This is one of those 
Political Discourses, translated into French144, which are 
quoted by Beccaria in 1762145, but never mentioned in 
Dei delitti.
In 1755, while the Select Society is discussing the 
question, Hume observes that «Punishment, without any 
proper purpose, is inconsistent with our ideas of good-
ness and justice»: «according to our conception, it should 
bear some proportion to the offence»146. A certain len-
ity may be natural to us: nothing can «steel the breast of 
judges and juries against the sentiments of humanity but 
reflections on necessity and public interest»147. As Hume 
136 A. Verri to P. Verri, 15 January 1767, in Viaggio a Parigi e Londra, 
cit., p. 251 (cfr. ibidem, p. 255). The «spectacle», Alessandro writes, does 
not excite «horror» nor offend «humanity» (ibidem, p. 251; cfr. ibidem, 
p. 255). The criminals are calm on their chariot pulled by a horse, their 
face is covered by a cap, and the executioner does not torment them 
(ibidem, p. 255): around them people enjoy themselves playing with 
snowballs (ibidem, pp. 251-254). It is like a «feast» (ibidem, pp. 252, 
255).
137 D. Hume, Of the Populousness of antient Nations, in Political Dis-
courses, cit., pp. 155-261: 202.
138 Ibidem.
139 Sallust, The War with Catiline, in Sallust, W. Heinemann, LOEB, Lon-
don 1921, pp. 94-95; cfr. ibidem, pp. 98-99; Livy Books VIII and IX, 13 
vols., W. Heinemann, LOEB, London 1926, vol. IV, pp. 388-389; Livy 
Books I and II, 13 vols., W. Heinemann, LOEB, London 1967, vol. I, pp. 
104-105.
140 On the «moderation» and «mildness» of punishments with the 
Romans and the «Porcian law», cfr. [Montesquieu] De l’Esprit des Loix, 
cit., vol. I, VI, XV, p. 141.
141 Hume, Of the Populousness of antient Nations, cit., p. 202.
142 Ibidem, p. 203.
143 Ibidem.
144 Cfr. Discours Politiques de Mr. David Hume, [transl. by E. de Mauvil-
lon], J. Schreuder & P. Mortier le Jeune, Amsterdam 1754, pp. 238-239.
145 C. Beccaria, Del disordine e de’ rimedi delle monete nello stato di Mila-
no nel 1762, in Scritti Economici, ed. by G. Gaspari, Mediobanca, Mila-
no 2014, II, I, p. 38. 
146 [D. Hume] Essay II [Of the immortality of the Soul], in Two Essays, 
cit., pp. 25-41: 32. 
147 Ibidem, p. 34. «This lenity» – Hume observes – «suits our natu-
ral ideas of right even towards the greatest of all criminals, and even 
though it prevents so inconsiderable a sufferance. Nay, even the most 
bigotted priest would naturally without reflection approve of it, provid-
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puts it in the moral Enquiry, what matters is the «Benefit 
of Society»148.
How many heads lying on the block and severed 
from their bodies, how many stretched out slender 
necks, illegal trials, and unjust sentences; and how many 
executions we meet with in Hume’s History, which Bec-
caria read with «infinite pleasure»149! But only a few 
remarks on those capital punishments which were inef-
fectual to the purpose, and no general reasoning on 
their illegitimacy or inhumanity. On the contrary, we 
find some remarks on them as necessary acts of sever-
ity. The execution of Sidney, Hume writes, is «one of 
the greatest blemishes» of the age150. The court and 
the ministry were «inexcusable»151. The evidence was 
«not legal» and the jury «very blameable», and this is a 
«great reproach on the administration»152. But Sidney 
was «undoubtedly guilty», he was always «a most inflex-
ible and most inveterate enemy to the royal family», and 
even «abused the King’s clemency»153. That the King 
should pardon such a man «might be an act of heroic 
generosity, but can never be regarded as a necessary and 
indispensible duty»154. This is History. And perhaps these 
are some of those thousand things that Hume could 
have said about Beccaria, and his philosophical Crimes.
In short, Morellet, who is connected with Hume, 
tells Beccaria that Hume desires him to tell Beccaria 
«one thousand things». Being the unfaithful and criti-
cized translator of Dei delitti, Morellet adds that Hume 
carefully read the original and the French translation 
and approved of Morellet’s use of translator’s licence. 
Beccaria thanks Morellet for Hume’s congratulations 
and celebrates Hume as a profound philosopher and 
a historian. Morellet tells Hume that he «faithfully» 
reported to Beccaria the fact that Hume paid atten-
tion to his work and said «good» things about it: Bec-
caria told him to tell Hume that he is «sensible» of this 
attention and «encouraged» by these things. Yet, Hume 
apparently never wrote to Beccaria, and certainly never 
ed the crime was not heresy or infidelity; for as these crimes hurt him-
self in his temporal interest and advantages, perhaps he may not be alto-
gether so indulgent to them» (ibidem, pp. 34-35).
148 «When any Man, even in political Society, renders himself, by his 
Crimes, obnoxious to the Public, he is punish’d by the Laws in his 
Goods and Person; that is, the ordinary Rules of Justice are, with Regard 
to him, suspended for a Moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict 
on him, for the Benefit of Society, what, otherwise, he could not suffer 
without Wrong or Injury» (Hume, Enquiry, cit., p. 40). 
149 C. Beccaria a A. Morellet, 26 gennaio 1766, Carteggio, cit., p. 223.
150 D. Hume, The History of Great Britain, A. Millar, London 1757, vol. 
II, p. 363. 
151 Ibidem, p. 362.
152 Ibidem, p. 363.
153 Ibidem. 
154 Ibidem.
wrote anything about Dei delitti in his published works. 
On the other hand, Hume’s friend Ramsay wrote a criti-
cism of Dei delitti, which is partly founded on Hume’s 
criticism of the contract theory and has something in 
common with Grimm’s and Diderot’s perplexity over 
Beccaria’s work. It is likely that Hume could agree, at 
least in part, with Ramsay’s reflections. It is certain 
that he could not accept any proposal for the abolition 
of capital punishment which was founded on a social 
contract, and it is equally certain that in the History he 
takes it as a matter of fact. 
Even if we could maintain that Hume had at his 
disposal some argumentative resources for a critique of 
the death penalty, it is a fact that he never used them, 
at least in his public writings nor – as far as I know – 
in his private correspondence. In 1766 d’Alembert 
informs him about the execution of La Barre («such an 
absurd and atrocious arrest [...] an abomination»)155, 
and twenty days afterwards Hume writes to the Mar-
quise de Barbentane concerning «the atrocious punish-
ment of the Chevalier de la Barre by the Parliament of 
Paris, on account of some youthful levities»156. Hume 
has no doubts: these «very strange stories [...] excite hor-
ror in every one, and give me a sensible concern»157. As a 
lover of France, he is «pleased to hear, that the indigna-
tion was as general in Paris as it is in all foreign coun-
tries»; as a philosophical historian he finds it «strange» 
that «such cruelty should be found among a people so 
celebrated for humanity, and so much bigotry amid so 
much knowledge and philosophy»158. Yet, even in this 
case, Hume does not appeal to Beccaria’s Delitti nor say 
a single word against capital punishment.
155 J.-B. Le Rond d’Alembert to D. Hume, 4 August 1766, in Letters of 
Eminent Persons Addressed to David Hume, ed. by J.H. Burton, W. 
Blackwood, Edinburgh and London 1849, pp. 196-197.
156 D. Hume to the Marquise de Barbentane, 29 August 1766, in The Let-
ters of David Hume, 2 vols., ed. by J.Y.T. Greig, Clarendon Press Oxford, 
1932, vol. II, p. 85.
157 Ibidem.
158 Ibidem.
